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ABSTRACT

With taxation of income being the most significant source of revenue, most national
governments consider tax evasion prevention to be one of the priorities of their tax agencies. In
the United States, tax evasion has been a significant concern of the Internal Revenue Service
ever since the modern income tax was instituted with the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment in
1913. Over the following century, Congress enacted numerous measures aimed at curbing the
illegal practice, but, as often is the case, both individuals and institutions desiring to not abide by
the law found new ways to outsmart the tax authorities. However, the recently introduced
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), the most complex piece of tax legislation in
modern times, will make tax evasion much more difficult, if not quite impractical. Through a
system of reporting requirements and severe penalties, the law aims to discourage the unlawful
practice, while at the same time it significantly amplifies the powers of the IRS. FATCA will
thus revolutionize the American tax regime and also serve as a significant step toward the
introduction of a global tax system in the future.

Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act:
The Most Revolutionary Piece of Tax Legislation
Since the Introduction of the Income Tax

I.

Introduction
As the federal government expanded over the course of the twentieth century, the

increasing need for financial resources necessitated the creation of an efficient and
comprehensive taxation system. Throughout that time the tax code evolved to address the
changing socioeconomic environment due to the forces of globalization, which made investment
banking increasingly interconnected and foreign markets easier to access. Recognizing this new
capability, certain taxpayers began to take measures to protect themselves from taxation by
hiding their income in low tax jurisdictions. Since citizenship rather than residence determines
tax liability for Americans, these tax evasion efforts naturally constitute criminal activity, which
has led the government to repeatedly take preventative measures to ensure proper compliance.
Another important step in this long history of regulation took place in 2010 when Congress
passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Designed to improve upon the
existing system of foreign financial account reporting, the legislation sets forth a framework of
cooperation between the IRS, and foreign financial institutions as well as governments. While
the mandates of the law ultimately focus on increasing tax revenue, they will inadvertently
revolutionize the way taxation works on an international scale. However, to understand this
potential significance of FATCA for the twenty-first century, it is necessary to examine how tax
evasion became such an unyielding global concern for governments throughout the world.
II. Taxation and Tax Evasion
A. Background
While taxation in the United States extends as far back as the American Revolution, it
was not until the turn of the nineteenth century that the modern tax system began to take shape.
The passing of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 settled all former controversies regarding the
constitutionality of the federal government’s power to levy income taxes. Previously, both
federal and state governments have taxed their residents’ incomes as most prominently seen with
1

the Revenue Act of 1861 during the Civil War. However, the explicit inclusion of the power to
collect taxes in the Constitution and the subsequent creation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made taxation of income an undisputable and permanent reality. With changing budgetary needs
over the following decades, the tax system underwent many changes such as the numerous
revisions of tax brackets or the introduction of payroll withholding. These changes as well as the
transformation of the IRS into a more efficient agency through deep restructurings made the
American tax system a source of contention for certain individuals desiring to limit their tax
burden.1 In theory, taxpayers around the world can easily shelter their income by moving it to
low tax jurisdictions through the use of various legal and accounting procedures, thereby
preventing their country of origin from having a claim to those taxes. However, individuals
having ties to the United States either through citizenship or residence cannot as easily
accomplish the same objective, since the American tax system substantially differs from its
foreign counterparts in its taxation approach.
B. Residence vs. Citizenship-based Taxation
Except the U.S. and the small African country of Eritrea, countries around the world
impose income taxes based on geographical location rather than legal status of the taxpayers.
Known as residence-based taxation (RBT), this concept holds that only the income of both
citizens and resident aliens living within the borders of a given country can be taxed.2 Taxpayers
from RBT countries who live in foreign tax jurisdictions can control how much tax they pay by
choosing where they reside and pay taxes. The system assumes that expatriates receive
government benefits exclusively in their chosen country of residence and, therefore, their country
of origin has no valid claim to the taxes on their income. This claim does not hold true when
these taxpayers receive income from sources like financial securities or realty in the country of
origin, because special rules might apply depending on the circumstances of each individual.
However, RBT fundamentally prevents the double taxation of income, which
1

“IRS at Work: IRS History.” TRAC IRS. Syracuse University, n.d. Web. 15 August 2015.
<http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/atwork/current/irsHistory.html>.
2
“A Guide To Relinquishing or Renouncing U.S. Citizenship.” RenunciationGuide.com. RenunciationGuide.com,
n.d. Web. 9 December 2015. <http://www.renunciationguide.com/citizenship-taxation-and-expatriation-background<http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/atwork/current/irsHistory.html>.
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n.d. Web. 9 December 2015. <http://www.renunciationguide.com/citizenship-taxation-and-expatriation-backgroundand-history/citizenship-based-taxation-international-comparison/>.
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subsequently results in its perception as a fair and equitable tax regime when compared to
citizenship-based taxation (CBT).3
On the other hand, CBT countries tax their citizens and permanent residents regardless of
where they choose to live. In the United States, Congress levies the personal income tax equally
on their worldwide income avoiding double taxation with foreign tax credits and foreign earned
income exclusions. As opposed to individuals in jurisdictions employing RBT, American
taxpayers theoretically cannot move abroad to limit their tax payable to the IRS, because they are
obligated by law to report all of their income regardless of its source. This complexity has
created unfavorable tax circumstances for many individuals, who in some cases resorted to tax
evasion or renunciation of their citizenship to protect their wealth.4 By employing various
accounting and legal procedures to transfer their income to offshore locations with low tax rates
and limited financial transparency, they can evade U.S. taxes. Despite the power of the American
legal system, neither the IRS nor the courts have much influence when dealing with these
nations, because their existence and status essentially depends on the dubious services provided
to these taxpayers.5
C. Tax Havens
With the financial services provided in offshore tax havens guaranteeing secrecy,
taxpayers have the capability to move their income generating sources to these locations. Their
main incentive for this comes through the disparity between the minimal tax rates found in these
offshore jurisdictions and the regular rates in their country of citizenship. In addition to the
favorable tax regimes, tax havens generally have strong financial secrecy laws, which make it
difficult for tax authorities to identify the taxpayers who use these services. With the financial
institutions in these local jurisdictions being legally shielded from cooperating with tax agencies
by virtue of these laws, the reporting requirement implicitly falls on the individual taxpayers,
who will not cooperate when their assets are already protected. The difficulty with uncovering
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“Residence-Based Taxation: A Necessary and Urgent Tax Reform.” American Citizens Abroad. American Citizens
Abroad, 1 March 2013. Web. 15 August 2015.
<https://americansabroad.org/files/9613/6302/0825/rbtmarch2013.pdf>.
4
Wood, Robert W. “Many Americans Renounce Citizenship, Hitting New Record.” Forbes. Forbes, 7 August 2014.
Web. 9 December 2015. < http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/07/many-americans-renouncecitizenship-hitting-new-record>.
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“The 2011 Global Executive: Individual Tax, Social Security and Immigration.” Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young, 1
August 2011. Web. 15 August 2015.
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_Executive_2011/$FILE/GE_2011_Global_Executive.pdf>.
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foreign asset holdings comes from the ability of accountants and lawyers to use the secrecy laws
of multiple tax havens to create overlapping shell corporations across the globe. Because the
local law protects these entities, it is difficult to determine the ownership chain throughout these
different jurisdictions. Ultimately, tax authorities have no legal leverage over these individuals if
they do not have evidence that they engaged in tax evasion in the first place.
Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and more recently cities in the Far East such as Hong
Kong have established a reputation as the tax jurisdictions of choice for wealthy individuals.
While Switzerland’s banking industry has turned into one of the country’s specializations over
the past century, the tax havens in developing regions have resorted to financial secrecy for
economic growth. By deliberately creating laws designed to limit transparency and financial
oversight, these jurisdictions attract foreign capital from wealthy individuals, spurring economic
growth. With their national economies primarily consisting of the finance industry, these
jurisdictions gain at the expense of other governments and through their sovereignty are legally
protected from any repercussions. While the list of declared tax havens might be surprisingly
short, most of the recent studies estimate that at least $20 trillion of capital is being held offshore
in these jurisdictions.6 Because the income generated by this capital is typically taxed at a low
rate, governments have started to look more closely at others ways to put a stop to the practice.
D. Previous Attempts to Curtail Tax Evasion
By definition, tax evasion consists of breaking the law by way of intending
to deliberately deprive the authorities of the taxes they have a legal right to collect.7 Because
personal income taxes represent almost half of federal tax revenue, this unlawful act has
repeatedly drawn the attention of the U.S. government, resulting in a series of legislation aimed
at decreasing the tax gap estimated to be $385 billion for the 2006 tax year.8 Starting with the
passing of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970, Congress aimed to curtail money laundering
and fraud by requiring the cooperation of financial institutions with the detection and reporting
of suspicious transactions. Additionally, this legislation also established the foundation for the
prevention of tax evasion by mandating both natural persons and legal entities to declare their
6

“Oxfam: Tax on $18.5 offshore trillions could end world poverty.” Tax Justice Network. Tax Justice Network, 22
May 2013. Web. 17 August 2015. <http://taxjustice.blogspot.ch/2013/05/oxfam-tax-on-offshore-trillionscould.html>.
7
“Tax Evasion.” Cornell University Law School. Cornell University Law School, n.d. Web. 9 December 2015.
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tax_evasion>.
8
Sahadi, Jeanne. “Tax gap: IRS comes up $385 billion short.” CNN. CNN, 6 January 2012. Web. 9 December 2015.
<http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/06/news/economy/tax_gap/>.
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foreign assets through the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). 9 The annual
filing of FinCEN Form 114, as the document is officially known, with the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network has been primarily intended for providing leads to track down illegal
activity based on the financial records used in these transactions.10 Although the purpose of the
BSA is to uncover financial fraud, the IRS uses the FBAR information in its efforts to prevent
tax evasion.
While the BSA forms the basis of the strategy of stopping tax evasion, the IRS has other
methods to encourage proper compliance. IRC §1441 obligates the withholding of 30% of U.S.
source income in the form of wages, interest, dividends or royalties paid out to nonresident
aliens. This mechanism prevents individuals, who neither have American citizenships nor
declared permanent residency in the U.S. from receiving income that would otherwise go
untaxed. The code section further stipulates that financial institutions based abroad can act as
Qualified Intermediaries by keeping records of transactions from U.S. payers in order to
accurately report income of the payees to the IRS and withhold taxes where necessary as
mandated by the code.11
In 2003, the IRS also started the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative to allow
taxpayers to become compliant by paying back taxes on their unreported income as well as any
applicable interest and penalties. The ability to avoid criminal prosecution for willful tax evasion
incentivized some individuals to cooperate with this amnesty program. While this only applied to
taxpayers who used foreign issued credit and debits cards to access their offshore bank accounts,
this IRS initiative enabled the agency to recover unpaid taxes, but also to get a new perspective
on the state of tax evasion perpetrated by American taxpayers.12
E. Recent Developments
9

“Bank Secrecy Act.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 1 October 2015. Web. 10 October 2015.
<http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Bank-Secrecy-Act>.
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Service. Internal Revenue Service, 10 June 2015. Web. 17 August 2015.
<http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Taxpayers-with-Foreign-Assets-May-Have-FBAR-and-FATCA-FilingRequirements-in-June>.
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“26 CFR 1.1441-1 - Requirement for the deduction and withholding of tax on payments to foreign persons.”
Cornell University Law School. Cornell University Law School, n.d. Web. 9 December 2015.
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.1441-1>.
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“IRS Unveils Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative; Chance for ‘Credit-Card Abusers’ to Clear Up Their Tax
Liabilities.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 14 January 2003. Web. 18 August 2015.
<https://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Unveils-Offshore-Voluntary-Compliance-Initiative;-Chance-for-%E2%80%98CreditCard-Abusers%E2%80%99-to-Clear-Up-Their-Tax-Liabilities>.
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While the efforts of the U.S. government to curb tax evasion were only successful to a
certain extent, two prominent controversies involving Swiss banks exposed the magnitude of the
problem and explained why the U.S. government needed legislature such as FATCA.
Switzerland has been the source of interest to American and European tax authorities, because of
its emphasis on confidentiality in individuals' banking affairs. An FBI investigation in 2008,
however, revealed that UBS AG, the largest bank in the country, sought American clients by
offering to shield their assets from the IRS.13 A similar investigation took place in 2014 when
Credit Suisse AG was found guilty of having assisted U.S. taxpayers in the filing of false income
tax returns and consequently illegally avoiding the proper payment of taxes.14 Ultimately, both
banks settled with the Justice Department for a cumulative sum of $3.6 billion. The cases of UBS
and Credit Suisse further illustrate that tax evasion is a crime not committed by dubious
unknown banks controlled by criminal organizations, but by well-regarded multinational
financial institutions. These prominent banks deliberately sought to assist American citizens in
the breaking of American law and hoped for financial secrecy laws to protect them from legal
scrutiny. While U.S. government representatives undoubtedly knew the extent of the illegal
activities before the investigations took place, these circumstances reveal why tax evasion
needed to be dealt with in a more powerful and concentrated effort through FATCA.
F. Introduction of the Legislation
Recognizing the need for a new approach to combat tax evasion, the American
government decided to prepare new legislation aimed at obtaining more complete information
about taxpayers and recovering a portion of the lost tax revenue. The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), was introduced in Congress on October 27, 2009 by Senator Max
Baucus and Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY). Ultimately, FATCA was added to the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, which was the first step to push the U.S. out of
the recession. The purpose behind the inclusion was to raise revenue through FATCA’s recovery
of unpaid taxes to fund the stimulus portion of the legislation. Although FATCA was subject to
much congressional debate, the bill was approved by Congress with several amendments and
13

Browning, Lynnley. “UBS Tax Evasion Case Sheds Light on Swiss Secrets.” Newsweek LLC. Newsweek LLC, 6
November 2014. Web. 18 August 2015. <http://www.newsweek.com/ubs-tax-evasion-case-shed-light-swiss-secrets282637>.
14
“Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns.”
Department of Justice. Department of Justice, 19 May 2014. Web. 20 August 2015.
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aid-and-assist-us-taxpayers-filing-falsereturns>.
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signed by President Obama on March 18, 2010. While a lot of progress has been made since the
time of its inception, the legislation has stirred up quite a lot of controversy surrounding its
rigorous and highly complex reporting requirements as well as its severe penalties for noncompliance.15
III. Mechanism of FATCA
A. Objectives of the Legislature
While the reporting requirements present in FATCA resemble those found in the FBAR
compliance process, legislators designed the law with the primary intent of collecting reliable
and complete information about the foreign accounts of American taxpayers. Because the U.S.
tax system relies on voluntary compliance by the taxpayers, the IRS could not confirm the
information presented on the FBAR without auditing the individuals. By engaging financial
institutions with the task, the agency ensures that it receives notice of all accounts belonging to
American taxpayers even if some are unreported or have underreported values on the FBAR.
Additionally by discouraging these financial institutions based in other countries from noncompliance through a series of strict penalties, the IRS guarantees that the provided information
can be relied upon with a high degree of certainty. With this two pronged approach of individual
and institutional reporting, the agency can cross-reference the provided information to identify
inconsistent reporting. By securing the involvement of foreign governments, the U.S. also
ensures its capability to reduce tax evasion by bringing together a collective of cooperating states
under its program that ultimately will lead to the creation of a global tax reporting system.
B. Reporting by Individual Taxpayers
Expanding on the individual reporting requirements set forth by the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, FATCA creates additional provisions that U.S. taxpayers have to abide by in order to
avoid significant penalties. For every year in which the taxpayer files an income tax return, he or
she must also file Form 8938 listing all specified foreign financial assets, which for the purposes
of the law include pensions, stocks, partnership interests and financial accounts held overseas.
However, only when the cumulative value of these assets exceeds the designated limit for the
filing category does the taxpayer need to comply with the requirements of this law. For a single
filer residing in the U.S., the reporting requirement takes effect if the assets are valued at $50,000
15

Chudy, James. “President Signs HIRE Act, Inclufding FATCA Provisions Combating Offshore Tax Evasion.”
Pillsbury Law. Pillsbury Law, 18 March 2010. Web. 20 August 2015.
<http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/DABAB60873CF5F730C54F8CE26B549B2.pdf>.
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or more at the end of the tax year or $75,000 at any other time during the year with the account
values correspondingly doubled for married filers. As previously mentioned, FATCA’s primary
aim is to identify domestic taxpayers with foreign accounts and take action against those trying
to evade tax. Therefore, the legislators imposed thresholds, which are less restrictive for
taxpayers filing a U.S. tax return, but currently living outside of the United States. For the same
taxpayer filing as single, the account values essentially quadruple to $200,000 and $300,000,
respectively.16
While both the FBAR and FATCA Form 8938 essentially serve the same purpose,
differences between the two laws, as shown in Exhibit A, demonstrate the complexity of how
U.S. legislators combat tax evasion. Although the FBAR filing process resembles the reporting
procedure required for Form 8938, it is filed electronically with the Department of Treasury by
the last day in June with no extensions available. The filing of the FBAR is administered
separately from the annual tax return sent to the IRS, but the agency still uses that information to
pursue taxpayers with illicit offshore operations. The BSA does not consider the current
residence of the taxpayers and sets a minimal $10,000 account value filing threshold, thus
targeting more taxpayers than FATCA. Therefore, circumstances where an individual has to
report financial accounts on an FBAR, but does not have to file FATCA Form 8938 can occur.
This difference in reporting requirements illustrates that FATCA was designed to identify
wealthy individuals for whom tax evasion protects a substantial amount of income from
taxation.17
This new approach to reducing tax evasion would not be as effective without penalty
provisions that discouraged taxpayers from improper compliance with the reporting rules. To
fairly administer the punishment, the FBAR makes the distinction between non-willful and
willful negligence; up to $10,000 for non-willful negligence and up to the greater of $100,000 or
half of the account balances for willful negligence. These penalties are administered per account
per person with signature authority, which means that a penalty is assessed for each account
unreported by one individual and that multiple taxpayers can be penalized for the same
16

“Do I need to file Form 8938, “Statement of Specified Foreign Assets”?” Internal Revenue Service. Internal
Revenue Service, 19 November 2014. Web. 20 August 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Do-Ineed-to-file-Form-8938-Statement-of-Specified-Foreign-Financial-Assets>.
17
“Comparison of Form 8939 and FBAR Requirements.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 2
February 2015. Web. 19 August 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Comparison-of-Form-8938-and-FBARRequirements>.
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unreported account.18 Whereas the penalty structure for FBAR compliance carries strict
penalties, the FATCA equivalent does not put as much strain on the taxpayers. However, since
noncompliant individuals likely will be subject to penalties imposed under both laws, the double
penalties encourage compliance with the law. Noncompliance with FATCA carries a simple
$10,000 penalty for each undisclosed account as well as another $10,000 for each thirty day
period of non-filing after being notified by the IRS for a maximum total penalty of $60,000. The
IRS, in addition to imposing criminal penalties, also reserves a non-expiring right to audit the
noncompliant individual if the form is not filed by the due date of the tax return causing the
statute to remain open indefinitely. Although the combined FBAR and FATCA penalties should
make taxpayers hesitant about filing a false tax return, the main component of FATCA places the
reporting mandate as well as the penalties on both foreign and domestic financial institutions.19
C. Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions
To ensure the truthfulness of the information provided by individual taxpayers,
lawmakers decided to institute a major provision into FATCA that provides the authorities with
another source of obtaining financial records. The law stipulates that certain types of entities in
the finance industry, collectively termed as foreign financial institutions (FFI), have to enter into
a cooperation agreement with the IRS to identify American taxpayers among its account holders
and disclose certain information about them. This reporting mandate only falls on institutions
which perform ordinary banking services, hold financial assets for other persons, engage in
trading or investing in various financial instruments or are insurance companies with cash value
products or annuities. While this definition encompasses the majority of common financial
institutions, most governmental entities, non-profit organizations, some retirement entities and
certain smaller local financial institutions are exempt from cooperating with the IRS. Although
the cooperation agreement with the IRS is voluntary, the list of FFIs, which registered with the
IRS and have started to report information about their account holders, is quite exhaustive,

18

“FBAR Penalties.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 1 July 2008. Web. 21 August 2015.
<http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-026-016.html#d0e529>.
19
“Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 8
October 2015. Web. 14 October 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCAReporting-for-U.S.-Taxpayers>.
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because they would rather complete the additional reporting than face the penalties imposed by
the IRS. 20 21
Following registration with the IRS as an FFI, the agreement obligates these entities to
fully cooperate with the agency in matters pertaining to account holders deemed to be American
taxpayers. Additionally, the IRS requires that financial accounts of foreign legal entities in which
U.S. interest either directly or indirectly represents more than 10% of the stock have to be
included in the reporting process. After identifying such individuals or entities, FFIs must
annually report account information including investment volume and income paid by the
account holder. While the identification and reporting procedures may seem trivial, the law
requires the financial institutions to comply with verification, due diligence and investigation
procedures. The obligations of FFIs do not stop at identification and reporting, because FATCA
also requires them to take punitive measures against U.S. persons or non-participating FFIs who
fail to comply with the law. In such circumstances, participating FFIs have to impose a 30%
withholding tax on payments of U.S. source income or gross proceeds from sale of investment
vehicles that create U.S. source income. This withholding tax is levied on non-participating FFIs
not exempt from the program, individuals not willing to comply with the identification process
and foreign entities which do not sufficiently disclose the identities of its U.S. owners. Thus,
FFIs are in the position of either losing their institutional sovereignty by conforming to a foreign
agency’s rules or facing the extensive penalties in case of non-compliance with the law. 22 23
D. Reporting by Domestic Financial Institutions
Just as foreign financial institutions have agreed to cooperate with the IRS under
FATCA, their domestic counterparts have been obligated with a set of withholding
responsibilities that make the law so daunting for non-compliant foreign institutions. With the
IRS having more authority domestically than abroad to administer the law, the agency tasked
U.S. financial institutions (USFIs) into acting as the primary withholding agents for the penalties
20

“FATCA Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and Entities.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue
Service, 02 June 2015. Web. 23 August 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-forForeign-Financial-Institutions>.
21
“The widespread reach of FATCA: How will it affect your business?” PwC. PwC, 1 August 2013. Web. 23
August 2015. <http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/publications/fatca-publications/assets/pwc-fatca-nonfs-mncs.pdf>.
22
“FATCA: A Brief Introduction.” PwC. PwC, n.d. Web. 23 August 2015. <http://www.pwc.lu/en/fatca/docs/pwcfatca-brief-introduction.pdf>.
23
“Summary of Key FATCA Provisions.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue Service, 6 November 2014.
Web. 24 August 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-Key-FATCA-Provisions>.
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levied on non-compliant FFIs. Because the USFIs essentially control the inflow and outflow of
funds in the American financial markets, they possess the unique ability to assist the IRS with
administering the integral penalty component of the law. FFIs, which do business in the United
States and use USFIs to gain access to American markets, would not be able to circumvent the
penalties without giving up their American business interests. While FFIs decided to cooperate to
avoid the penalties of the IRS, non-participating foreign institutions have to face severe penalties
that make it practically impossible to remain financially operational. In a time when the United
States is one of the central financial centers, every transaction taking place around the globe at
some point passes through American markets or involves the U.S. dollar. Therefore, operating
entirely outside of American influence is very difficult for any sizable FFI that aims to remain
profitable. Recognizing the impact that such circumstances would have on most investment
banks, the IRS decided to use the USFIs to get FFIs to participate in its identification and
reporting program.24 25
While the majority of financial institutions opted to comply with the FATCA regulations,
non-participating FFIs have to face the significant penalty the IRS deemed necessary to make
non-compliance a bad choice. The agency instituted a 30% withholding penalty on passthru
payments of U.S. source income made to non-compliant FFIs. These withholdable payments
include periodic payments such as interest and dividends, gains from disposition of property that
produce U.S. source income and deposit interest paid by American banks and their foreign
branches. When considered in the context of global financial operations, any FFI involved in
American markets would be faced with an automatic 30% that could not be mitigated with
careful tax planning through the use of international treaties. Since such a significant reduction in
income would, as expected, negatively impact the financial results of these institutions, the vast
majority of FFIs decided to cooperate with the IRS and undertake the additional reporting
procedures mandated by FATCA. While the requirements of the law primarily focus on FFIs to

24

Buetow, Bob. “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act: What Domestic Financial Institutions Need to Know!”
Wipfli LLP. Wipfli LLP, 1 March 2014. Web. 24 August 2015.
<http://www.wipfli.com/resources/images/40411.pdf>.
25
“FATCA Information for U.S. Financial Institutions and Entities.” Internal Revenue Service. Internal Revenue
Service, 29 May 2015. Web. 23 august 2015. <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/FATCA-Informationfor-United-States-Entities>.
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assist with combating tax evasion, the government has also created treaties with foreign nations
to assist with the reporting process on a national scale.26
E. International Cooperation
With each country having its own unique set of confidentiality and banking secrecy
laws, FFIs in some of these jurisdictions could not cooperate with the IRS without breaking the
those national laws. While the financial institutions obviously could not disregard them and
definitely wanted to cooperate to avoid the penalties, the FATCA lawmakers realized that they
would have work with foreign governments into making the reporting requirement legal. By
getting governments proactively involved in the process, Congress was able to eliminate all
obstacles once FATCA mandates became national responsibilities. As such, the Department of
Treasury partnered with numerous foreign governments including some tax havens to combat tax
evasion through treaties called inter-governmental agreements (IGA).
While the signing of treaties has been a commonplace resolution to a variety of global
tax issues, the IGAs present in FATCA set a new precedent for international cooperation. They
establish the grounds necessary for governments to exchange information about individual
taxpayers and combat their tax evasion efforts through a network of allied states. Since some
foreign nations have laws expressly prohibiting the disclosure of private information, it was
necessary for them to amend their laws to incorporate the FATCA mandates. There are two
different models of the cooperation agreements in which both IGAs necessitate that foreign
governments will require FFIs operating within their jurisdictions to cooperate with the IRS.
With the identification and reporting requirement becoming part of the national legal system,
these financial institution do not possess any other options that to cooperate unless they have
exempt status. As such, non-compliance with FATCA carries the 30% withholding penalty on
U.S. source income and also includes the penalties associated with breaking the laws of the local
jurisdiction. 27
Under the Model 1 IGA, the FFIs identify American accounts in accordance with
FATCA’s due diligence rules and report that information to the appropriate authority of the
26

“The road ahead: An in-depth analysis of the temporary and Final FATCA Regulations incorporating Notice
2014-33.” Deloitte. Deloitte, n.d. Web. 25 August 2015.
<http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-FATCA-incorporating-notice012215.pdf>.
27
“Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).” Out-Law. Pinsent Masons, 1 November 2014. Web. 1
September 2015. <http://www.out-law.com/sectors/financial-services1/banks/foreign-account-tax-compliance-actfatca/>.
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partner government, which then passes that information along to the IRS on an automatic basis.
Whereas this involves the foreign authorities in the information exchange, Model 2 stipulates
that FFI have to report the taxpayers’ information directly to the IRS without the need for any
other parties to be involved in the process. While under both Model 1 and Model 2 the FFIs are
obligated by their local law to cooperate with the FATCA reporting procedures, Model 1 sets up
the stage for international cooperation in developing a worldwide tax reporting system.28
While the reported information has value to the IRS, the widespread international
cooperation creates a network of allied nations that is more efficient in reducing tax evasion. The
Department of Treasury has signed over 70 IGAs and reached an agreement in substance with
almost 40 additional foreign governments. With the notable exceptions of Austria, Bermuda,
Hong Kong, Japan and Switzerland among others, the vast majority of foreign tax authorities
opted to cooperate with the IRS under the Model 1 IGA. Cooperation under this particular IGA
is especially advantageous for these nations, because the United States agreed to a reciprocal
version termed Model 1A that enables the U.S. to share information about the taxpayers of the
partner country. This reporting reciprocity incentivizes foreign nations to cooperate with the
U.S., because they can institute their own tax evasion prevention programs similar to FATCA
with access to the account information from the U.S. Since countries that are traditionally
opposed to U.S. global initiatives such as Russia or China, and renowned tax havens such as
Cayman Islands or Hong Kong decided to cooperate with the Americans, there do not exist many
other places with the necessary laws and accounting standards to make tax evasion a viable
alternative for certain taxpayers. With their options for offshore banking now limited, potential
tax evaders either have to come up with new schemes or comply with the IRS.29
While FATCA relies on international cooperation to prevent tax evasion by individual
taxpayers, it is not the first program to address proper tax compliance on a global level. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international body
primarily composed of Western countries, has been working to address the problem of Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). On October 5 2015 the OECD finished its action plan that
identified 15 key areas that need to be addressed to prevent multinational corporations from
28
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manipulating global tax loopholes to avoid paying tax. Since the release, leaders of G-20
countries have endorsed the program and agreed to take the first steps to enact its precepts by
2017. While this program focuses on tax avoidance by multinational corporations, it shows that
international cooperation is an effective tool that can have a positive impact to correct taxation
issues.30
F. Implementation
While FATCA represents years of cumulative efforts by legislators to combat tax
evasion, the mandates of the law have only gradually been coming into effect over the past four
years. The implementation of the law has been occurring in separate stages designated for
domestic and foreign financial institutions with different deadlines for the registration, reporting
and withholding components. According to Exhibit B, in 2014 the IRS opened its systems for
FFIs to register and receive a Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN). Although the
deadline for registration was May 5, FFIs in jurisdictions with Model 1 IGAs with the U.S.
received more time to complete this part due to the involvement of their local governments in the
process. With the first monthly Registered FFI list published on June 2, the penalty component
by the withholding agents came into effect only a month later on July 1. Because the deadline to
register with the IRS already passed, the 30% withholding tax applied to any FFIs not listed in
the agency’s monthly list. This first stage of the process was intended to establish the
cooperation of governments and FFIs before the actual reporting could happen. 2014 marked the
implementation of the reporting requirement with information from FFIs in non-IGA
jurisdictions and FFIs in Model 2 IGA jurisdictions due on March 31 and that from FFIs in
Model 1 IGA jurisdictions six months later on September 30. The required information at the
beginning of the process included only the basic account information already required on the
FBAR such as the owner’s name, address, account number and balance. However, starting in
2016, all FFIs will also be required to individually report any income paid to the account, which
will form the basis of how much tax the account holders will have to pay to the IRS that year. 31
While this gradual implementation of FATCA prevents its financial effects from being promptly
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recognized, the law will bring about significant long-term changes to both American and global
taxation.
IV. Significance of FATCA
A. Importance for Global Taxation
While ultimately the primary intent of FATCA was to increase the tax revenue collected
by the IRS, its less obvious effects definitely eclipse the financial significance of the law for the
federal government. Chief among those is that it represents the first step necessary for the
creation of a global tax system based on cooperation of nations focused on eliminating tax
evasion and enforcing proper tax compliance. While it may at first seem that the mandates of the
law create excessive burden for foreign financial institutions, the mandatory cooperation with the
IRS ensures that the process of international tax system convergence actually takes place. As
opposed to a voluntary initiative through which some countries could decide against
participating, FATCA’s compulsory nature ensures that uncooperative nations do not defeat the
practicality of the project. If this global tax system were to originate as a multinational effort of
like-minded governments, existing tax havens would feel no need to comply and tax evasion
would continue just as freely as before. However, since the success of the project depends upon
complete global cooperation, the existence of tax havens in their current form remains difficult in
the future under the mandates of FATCA. With the possibility of sanctions on their local
financial institutions or the prospect of information reciprocity, these jurisdictions recognize that
cooperation inherently represents the more beneficial alternative in the long run. While this may
seem like policing the world through a carrot or stick approach, the U.S. is simply the only world
power capable of ensuring the cooperation of other nations through its unrivaled economic and
financial infrastructure. 32
Because the success of a global tax system is contingent upon the cooperation of all
countries across the world, FATCA is the first step in the creation process of such a system. With
over 100 countries guaranteeing their cooperation with the IRS under the reciprocity directives
of the IGAs, the overwhelmingly positive response indicates that foreign governments recognize
the benefits associated with being part of this new initiative. Even though FATCA places the
FFIs within the control of the IRS, these governments decided to partake in the information
32
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exchange, since they can increase their tax revenues as well as obtain information about their
taxpayers living in the U.S. While the cooperation of Western nations could have been
reasonably expected, FATCA’s global reach becomes more impressive once it is recognized that
countries such as Russia or China have already signed up for the program. These nations do not
typically contribute to multilateral initiatives by the U.S. and its allies, and in some situations
even try to publicly undermine those efforts. However, in the case of taxation, all nations,
regardless of their alliances, have a common goal of preventing tax evasion and recognize that
working together with other nations will make that goal more attainable. Subsequently, all
governments desiring to limit what revenue they lose to tax haven abuse will naturally support
the creation of a global tax system, which is the only way of effectively accomplishing such an
objective. As follows, the existing tax havens would have no choice but to agree to the program
under the increasing pressure just as Switzerland and the Cayman Islands have already done.33
While the mandates of FATCA will only come into full effect starting in 2016, there
already exists a framework for a more formal and automatic process of exchanging information
among countries. Introduced on October 29, 2014 as the Automatic Exchange of Information on
Financial Accounts, the agreement builds on FATCA’s policies and procedures to make the
exchange process not so centered on the U.S. It creates a single global standard referred to as the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) through which information can be exchanged automatically
between countries and not just upon request in cases of criminal investigations involving
taxation. Aside from the modified international structure, the mechanism behind the law remains
largely similar to the one already developed for the benefit of the United States in FATCA. The
comparable account and information requirements in the two laws are very comparable, but
withholding penalties for non-compliance are obviously absent from the CRS. While it may
seem that CRS is a voluntary initiative that cannot succeed, it can be thought of as both a
continuation and extension of FATCA, which created the environment necessary for such an
agreement to be reached among those nations in the first place. While the exchange of
information under the CRS will begin in 2017 among the starting 56 jurisdictions, the program
will expand in 2018 to encompass more than 100 countries. Because FATCA demonstrates the
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benefits of cooperation, the CRS most likely will gain momentum in the future by involving even
more countries.34
B. Importance for Domestic Taxation
Tax code reform has become a major aspect of the political debate with some individuals
even going as far as to call for a complete abolishment of the IRS. Although the great variety of
reform proposals from both the liberals and conservatives always target the simplification of the
code, increased regulation through laws such as FATCA makes it clear that the objective should
not be to make the code simple, but rather to make it more efficient and effective. By increasing
the rules for individual reporting of income, FATCA ensures an increase in the extent of
compliance with the tax code and guarantees that the government receives its appropriate share
of taxes. While the law specifically focuses on collecting taxes only from individuals with
certain foreign accounts, the principles as well as the procedures from this one tax area can help
to revamp the code for dealing with other types of taxpayers. Therefore, claims that FATCA
unnecessarily complicates the already highly complex tax code do not consider the basis from
which this piece of legislation can help the reform process in the future.
Although some provisions of the law might indeed seem redundant or too liberal in
scope, one cannot argue that the framework for increasing compliance is not far superior to the
system that it was designed to improve upon. Over the last century the policy regarding taxation
of taxpayers with foreign assets has systematically become more complex with introduction of
new laws and compliance only became more effective with each iteration. As such, the
introduction of FATCA, while groundbreaking in several distinct areas, can nonetheless be
considered as the modern update to the code in this continuous process of improvement.
Similarly, reform proposals for the entire tax code should be broken down into sections, which
focus on solving specific problems like FATCA does to the ones persistent in taxation of foreign
accounts.
Since FATCA introduces several additional components into the taxation of foreign
accounts, the IRS’s proper administration of the reporting program with FFIs will be crucial to
the law’s success. The agency performs a crucial role in the administration of the tax regime and
34
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will only expand once FFIs across the world begin reporting the accounts of American taxpayers.
This stream of information will need to be efficiently processed and appropriate steps will have
to be taken by the IRS to deal with tax evading individuals. Therefore, the integral role of the
IRS in this process will increase the scope of the agency’s actions and will most likely
necessitate additional resources from the federal budget. Since the improvement in the quality of
information will undoubtedly increase tax return examinations conducted by the agency,
enforcement of the tax code will become a more substantial endeavor that will need more
attention by the IRS. In the scope of FATCA itself, the IRS receives more authority on an
international basis by being able to request more information from FFIs as well as require their
cooperation with any potential investigations. With the emergence of CRS, the tax authorities of
participating countries including the IRS will play a more significant role in how their respective
governments conduct their operations. Therefore, due to its experience with the provisions of
FATCA, the IRS can serve as model for foreign tax agencies, which will need to implement its
own reporting and enforcement frameworks.35
IV. Criticism of FATCA
While FATCA became law without significant legislative setbacks due to the Democratic
control of Congress, the law has been consistently facing severe criticism from its opponents.
Some individuals have started to question whether the cost of the entire reporting procedure is
worth the incremental increase in tax revenue for the government, because the program
necessitates the creation of additional administrative functions that will add to the burden on the
federal budget. Critics claim that the any additional revenue in the short term would be offset by
the increased expenditures, leading the law to provide no net tax benefit. Additionally, these
critics also say that if FATCA does not undergo amendment, the U.S. financial markets will lose
capital due to foreign investors withdrawing their funds from the reach of the IRS. Capital flight
is possible, but due to America’s position as the center of the business world, it seems unlikely
that foreign investment would move elsewhere solely due to changes in the tax code. However,
other critics have taken a more theoretical approach by claiming that FATCA’s intrusive nature
constitutes a violation of rights for Americans taxpayers. They believe that with the additional
35
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reporting mandate by FFIs, American expatriates living and working abroad will be subject to
unfavorable treatment due to the reporting obligations of institutions doing business with U.S.
taxpayers. Certain taxpayers have started to report that due to FATCA’s additional compliance
costs for FFIs, they either had their financial accounts closed or experienced substantial difficulty
opening new ones. This discrimination, caused indirectly by the actions of the U.S. government,
has even forced some individuals to take the extreme step of renouncing their citizenship to
forever limit their exposure to the far-flung reach of the IRS. While FATCA’s mandates do not
go into effect until 2016, in 2014 3,415 former U.S. taxpayers have decided to separate their ties
with their native land.36 In light of these drawbacks, the Republican National Committee in the
U.S. and the Alliance for the Defence of Canadian Sovereignty (ADCS) in Canada have made
efforts to obstruct the approval of FATCA over the last few years. These actions, however, have
not achieved much success in their respective legal systems, because the law remains on course
to take effect in its original form as originally scheduled.37 38
While overall it may seem that these drawbacks of FATCA make it impractical, they have to
be compared to the law’s positive long-run effects when evaluating its utility. With the reporting
and withholding requirements beginning in 2016, it might take some time to notice FATCA’s
ability to decrease tax evasion. The law builds the foundation on which a global tax system will
develop that will limit tax evasion on a worldwide basis through inter-governmental cooperation.
If the CRS succeeds at eliminating the majority of tax evasion schemes currently found in tax
havens, it will not only return to governments their tax revenue, but also to a certain extent make
it substantially more difficult for criminal organizations to conduct their illegal operations. With
efforts to eradicate drug dealing, human trafficking or arms trading clearly not having the desired
approach when battled directly, perhaps the introduction of FATCA and the CRS represent an
appropriate opportunity to finally change the approach. Ultimately, the negative effects of
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FATCA are a small price to pay compared to benefits of limiting of tax evasion in addition to
fostering cooperation between governments in the long-run.
V. Conclusion
After decades of efforts aimed at limiting revenue losses stemming from tax evasion, the
federal government finally came up with a solution that is its best opportunity to eradicate the
illegal activity. While FATCA can be criticized for being too complex and burdensome, the
many benefits of the law that will come to their full potential in the future undoubtedly make it a
net positive initiative to prevent tax evasion. While undoubtedly new tax evasion schemes will
emerge in the future, FATCA’s mandates bring the world of global taxation into a new era of
international cooperation. The convergence of taxation systems worldwide signifies that
governments are changing their approach toward how they collect tax revenue in face of
challenges of the modern time. Since inevitably the Common Reporting Standard will gain
momentum once FATCA takes firm hold, the evolution of global taxation will continue to
progress with new significant improvements taking effect along the way.
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Exhibit A – Comparison of FATCA Form 8938 and FinCEN Form 114

Who Must File?

Form 8938, Statement of Specified
Foreign Financial Assets

FinCEN Form 114, Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts (FBAR)

Specified individuals, which include U.S
citizens, resident aliens, and certain nonresident aliens that have an interest in
specified foreign financial assets and
meet the reporting threshold

U.S. persons, which include U.S. citizens, resident
aliens, trusts, estates, and domestic entities that have
an interest in foreign financial accounts and meet the
reporting threshold

Does the United No
States include U.S.
territories?

Yes, resident aliens of U.S territories and U.S.
territory entities are subject to FBAR reporting

$50,000 on the last day of the tax year or $10,000 at any time during the calendar year
$75,000 at any time during the tax year
Reporting
(higher threshold amounts apply to
Threshold (Total married individuals filing jointly and
Value of Assets) individuals living abroad)
If any income, gains, losses, deductions,
credits, gross proceeds, or distributions
from holding or disposing of the account
When do you have or asset are or would be required
an interest in an to be reported, included, or otherwise
account or asset? reflected on your income tax return

What is
Reported?
How are
maximum account
or asset values
determined and
reported?
When Due?

Maximum value of specified foreign
Maximum value of financial accounts maintained by
financial assets, which include financial a financial institution physically located in a foreign
accounts with foreign financial
country
institutions and certain other foreign nonaccount investment assets
Fair market value in U.S. dollars in
accord with the Form 8938 instructions
for each account and asset reported
Convert to U.S. dollars using the end of
the taxable year exchange rate and report
in U.S. dollars.

Penalties

Use periodic account statements to determine the
maximum value in the currency of the account.
Convert to U.S. dollars using the end of the calendar
year exchange rate and report in U.S. dollars.

By due date, including extension, if any, Received by June 30 (no extensions of time granted)
for income tax return
File with income tax return pursuant to
instructions for filing the return

Where to File?

Financial interest: you are the owner of record or
holder of legal title; the owner of record or holder of
legal title is your agent or representative; you have a
sufficient interest in the entity that is the owner of
record or holder of legal title.

File electronically through FinCENs BSA EFiling System. The FBAR is not filed with a
federal tax return.

Up to $10,000 for failure to disclose and If non-willful, up to $10,000; if willful, up to the
an additional $10,000 for each 30 days of greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of account
non-filing after IRS notice of a failure to balances; criminal penalties may also apply
disclose, for a potential maximum
penalty of $60,000; criminal penalties
may also apply

Source: https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Comparison-of-Form-8938-and-FBAR-Requirements
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Exhibit B – Summary of FATCA Timelines
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Exhibit B (Continued) – Summary of FATCA Timelines

Source: https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCA-Timelines
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